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FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9186
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2106
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5580
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9176
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6754
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4563
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2557
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

S E C R E T RANGOON 000405

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2019

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [BM](#)

SUBJECT: TALKING WITH JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA IN RANGOON
ABOUT DPRK-BURMA RELATIONSHIP

REF: A. RANGOON 387

[1](#)B. RANGOON 392

[1](#)C. TOKYO 1413

[1](#)D. STATE 66749

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

[1](#)1. (S) Japanese Ambassador to Burma Nogawa told Charge that on June 29 he conveyed his Government's "serious concerns" about DPRK proliferation to MOFA Deputy Minister Maung Myint and urged Burma to "fully enforce" UNSC Res. 1874. Nogawa added that Japan is willing to help Burma move toward democracy; however, if the GOB fails to implement 1874, it is "inevitable that bilateral relations will be substantially affected." Maung Myint replied very much as MOFA interlocutors responded to U.S. demarches last week (Refs A and B): that Burma as a UN member will abide by the UNSC resolution, so Japan needn't be concerned. Nogawa said he briefly tried to discuss "concrete" means Burma might use to implement 1874; however, meeting time was running short and Maung Myint showed "no interest."

[1](#)2. (S) The Charge used his June 30 meeting with Nogawa to raise the Ref D theme about the usefulness of including a third party, perhaps Japan, in any 1874 inspection in Burma. Nogawa indicated he had not received any instructions from Tokyo about that concept, though he clearly understood the usefulness of the theme. During the Charge's meeting, the Japanese Embassy received word from its own sources that the North Korean ship, the Kang Nam 1, appears to have reversed course, seemingly relieving any immediate pressure for a Burmese inspection. Nonetheless, the Charge noted and Nogawa concurred that, given the DPRK-Burma relationship, at some point a test of 1874 inspections in Burma is likely. Between now and then, the U.S. and Japan will need to work together closely to ensure a productive outcome for the world's non-proliferation goals.

[1](#)3. (S) Late in the afternoon, South Korean Ambassador Park came by on short notice to discuss the Kang Nam 1. Park noted that the ship has turned around. He figures Senior General Than Shwe decided pressures are too intense for the ship to arrive Burma now, so better to put off that matter and focus instead on resolving the Aung San Suu Kyi issue, having a useful visit with SYG Ban, and preparing for the

2010 elections. Park was intensely curious about the Burmese calling in of the DPRK Ambassador last week (Refs A and B). Park, himself, has yet to discuss the Kang Nam 1 with Burmese authorities. He asked to meet with the Deputy Minister but has not received approval. Park noted reports that the GOB has raised the possibility of third country assistance with inspections. The Charge conveyed the USG interest in a credible inspection regime being in place for Burma ports, including the potential usefulness of third-country participation. Park and the Charge agreed to stay in close touch on 1874 implementation.

DINGER